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In Defence of  Corporate Responsibility 
CHRIS MARSDEN*
Two serious criticisms of CSR have emerged from separate ends of the political spectrum. They are 
levelled at the heart of the purpose of business and what companies, particularly large companies are 
responsible for. From the Left, Joel Bakan, in his book and subsequent film, The Corporation, al-
leges that CSR is a smokescreen, enabling companies to hide their bad practices and strengthen their 
ability to resist regulation by government. From the Right, The Economist, building on arguments 
that hark back to Milton Friedman and even Adam Smith, has argued that CSR is a waste of 
resources, distracting companies from their core roles of producing goods and services, and making 
profits. These criticisms are misguided but they have intellectual foundations; as such they risk under-
mining much that is important and require rebuttal. Both overplay the role that governments can and 
will play in regulating how companies behave, and underestimate the positive contribution that NGOs 
can make in shaping the social environment in which businesses operate. This paper argues that cor-
porate responsibility (CR not CSR) cannot justifiably be seen as a hindrance to the effective evolution 
of a proper market governance system. On the contrary it is a crucial part of the only realistic game in 
town and could become the key building block in such an evolution. 
Keywords: corporation, social responsibility, globalisation, governance 
1. Introduction 
Once a fringe idea, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is now part of the business 
mainstream. Most major companies have CSR policies and leading Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) regularly acknowledge their wider responsibilities to society and the 
environment. Lacking precise definition, CSR has thrived as a general ‘motherhood’ 
concept but has suffered because it encompasses such a wide range of business activ-
ity from supporting good causes and investment in community projects to employ-
ment practices and environmental and human rights impact management. CSR has 
always attracted its fair share of critics. Detractors have dismissed it as corporate phi-
lanthropy1 by another name or worse, as meaningless froth. Now, two more serious 
________________________ 
*  Chris Marsden is Chair of the Amnesty International (UK) Business Group and Chair of Trus-
tees of the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. He is also visiting professor at the In-
ternational School of Management of the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées in Paris. He 
was formerly Head of Community affairs with BP. Chris Marsden, 45 Bloomfield Road, Harpen-
den, Hertfordshire, AL5 4DD, UK, phone: +44-1582-762844, e-mail: clmarsden@ntlworld.com. 
1  Corporate philanthropy as pure philanthropy is justly criticised because it amounts to directors 
giving away the shareholders money (often for their own personal reasons) instead of giving it 
back to the shareholders to decide what they want to do with it. If, as is often the case, such 
payments are strategic investment in community relations or image building, then they are not 
strictly philanthropy. Community investment is part, but only a small part, of a company’s overall 
impact on social and environmental issues and, therefore, its social responsibility. 
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criticisms of CSR have emerged from separate ends of the political spectrum. This is 
not about philanthropy or giving something back to society as some kind of con-
science-easer for taking so much out. It is levelled at the heart of the purpose of busi-
ness and what companies, particularly large companies,2 are responsible for. It is about 
whether companies should take account of social and environmental concerns beyond 
those that clearly affect a company’s operating capabilities. 
In his book and subsequent film, The Corporation, Joel Bakan alleges that CSR is a 
smokescreen, enabling companies to hide their bad practices and strengthen their 
ability to resist regulation by government (Bakan 2004: 151). Separately, The Econo-
mist (2005) has argued that CSR is a waste of resources, distracting companies from 
their core roles of producing goods and services, and making profits. These criticisms 
are misguided but they have intellectual foundations and require rebuttal. Both over-
play the role that governments can and will play in regulating how companies behave, 
and underestimate the positive contribution that NGOs can make in shaping the so-
cial environment in which businesses operate. They also exploit the confusion which 
surrounds the meaning of CSR. By attacking, with some justification, some aspects of 
CSR and its abuse, they threaten to undermine the fundamental notion of corporate 
responsibility (CR),3 which was never a fringe idea; it simply was not seen to encom-
pass the range of issues which have to be confronted today. Unlike CSR, which too 
often seems to describe widely varying lists of activities, CR is a way of doing business 
which takes into account all of a company’s impacts on society. 
Bakan says that CSR presents a potentially dangerous sop enabling companies to ap-
pear to be addressing their social and environmental ‘externalities’ and thereby dis-
tracting pressure for government intervention and proper regulation. He argues that 
robust nongovernmental institutions and community activism, though vital contribu-
tors, can never be a substitute for government regulation. “Many among the corporate 
elite and their defenders would likely sing ‘Hallelujah’ the day activists against corpo-
rate abuse abandoned government. That is, after all, what many business leaders want: 
replacement of government regulation of corporations with market forces, perhaps 
shaped by the oversight of nongovernmental organisations (with no legal powers) and 
the demands of conscientious consumers and shareholders (with minimal effects)” 
(Bakan 2004: 151).
The Economist argues that free enterprise capitalism provides huge value for society 
and for this to take place most efficiently companies need to focus on what they do 
best, competing for market share and maximising returns for shareholders, undis-
________________________ 
2  Large companies individually have greater potential to affect the environment and social issues, 
to have command over resources, to control information, gain uncompetitive market share and 
exert undue influence. 
3  Corporate Social Responsibility, especially its initials CSR, has become the widely used shorthand 
term to cover any or all of a list of activities from corporate philanthropy (see footnote 1 above) 
to the responsible management of a company’s external impacts on society. The concept is wide 
open to misinterpretation and abuse. The term corporate responsibility (CR) is preferred here 
and will be used for the remainder of this paper as it denotes a way of doing business which takes 
account of a company’s full range of responsibilities to all its stakeholders, not just its social ones 
and especially not just its ‘philanthropic’ ones. 
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tracted by environmental and social agendas which are the proper concern of gov-
ernments. 
“Through the action of (Adam) Smith’s invisible hand, the private search for 
profit does advance the public interest. There is no need for thought-leaders in 
CSR armed with initiatives and compacts to bring this about. It is an error to 
suppose that profit-seeking, as such, fails to advance the public good, and that 
special efforts to give something back to society are needed to redeem it” (The 
Economist 2005). 
In a narrow sense, they are both right. Bakan justly accuses many companies of hiding 
under a pretence of social responsibility. The Economist’s argument that the public 
interest regarding the production and distribution of goods and services is likely to be 
served best by market players pursuing their self interest in a competitive market place 
has been well rehearsed ever since Adam Smith invented the concept of the ‘invisible 
hand’. Nevertheless economic theory (e.g. the unreality of assumptions underpinning 
competition theory) and experience of market failure show that public welfare cannot 
be left entirely to the product of individuals and groups pursuing self-interest. The 
Economist quite correctly argues: 
“As a general rule, correcting market failure is best left to government. Business 
cannot be trusted to get it right. Settling such questions (as global warming) ex-
ceeds the competence and proper remit of private enterprise. (…) The proper 
guardians of the public interest are governments, which are accountable to all 
citizens. It is the job of elected politicians to set goals for regulators, to deal with 
externalities, to mediate among different interests, to attend to the demands of 
social justice, to provide public goods and collect the taxes to pay for them, to 
establish collective priorities where that is necessary and appropriate, and to or-
ganise resources accordingly. The proper business of business is business” (The 
Economist 2005). 
Where they are both wrong, however, is in their implicit assumptions that the exercis-
ing of corporate responsibility has no positive effects and that positive effects can 
only be achieved through government action. The gaping hole in both Bakan’s call for 
more government regulation and the Economist’s assertion as to the proper role of 
government in regulating the market place is not that this should not ideally happen – 
of course it should – but that it is very unlikely to, certainly to the necessary degree, in 
the foreseeable future. The governance paradigm has changed, although many with 
vested interests in the old system do not, or do not want to, recognise it. The cosy 
idea that companies can be left to pursue the narrow interests of their shareholders 
because the interests of other groups are either factored into the company’s business 
model or looked after by a strong, representative government and fair legal system 
simply no longer holds up.  
There may be countries in the ‘First World’ where this state of affairs more or less still 
exists. Certainly there are many people who assume that it does still exist. But even in 
these countries, the ability of governments to regulate and tax their larger companies, 
particularly multinational companies, is increasingly inadequate. Reasons include the 
need to prioritise global competitiveness, the increasing complexities of company 
technologies and organisational and financial structures with which government offi-
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cials struggle to keep up, and the difficulties of applying domestic law to international 
activities. 
Beyond the relatively well-regulated ‘First World’ economies, regulation and the rule 
of law varies from weak to non-existent. This needs to be seen at two levels. 
Firstly, in the vast majority of countries, companies face very little regulation. This is 
because even diligent governments struggle to regulate for the public interest effec-
tively, while many others either do not try very hard or are plain corrupt. Large com-
panies, whether domestic, private or state owned, or multinational, are often faced 
with huge environmental and social issues, with which governments are either not 
coping or wilfully disregarding. Should they just wring their corporate hands, say that 
these are matters for the government and blithely ignore them? If they do, are they 
not in some way complicit in the environmental or social harm that is being done, 
either directly or indirectly associated with their activities? 
Secondly, increasingly, markets and the companies operating in them are global. Na-
tional boundaries are increasingly irrelevant to movements of information, capital, 
goods and even people. Many of the leading environmental and social issues are also 
global in nature and need global strategies to address them. As with such issues at the 
national level, ideally it should be governments and the law that deal with them. But 
there is no effective system of global government or global cooperation of national 
governments and only some embryonic concepts of international law. Therefore, 
should not multinational companies, which often have global logistic, technical and 
financial capabilities, which exceed many national governments, play an active part in 
addressing the issues? 
The fact is multinational companies are major players in these spheres. They are not 
democratic, they are inclined to ‘greenwash’4 to being two-faced, and even in Bakan’s 
terms ‘pathological’. They have huge potential to contribute positively towards these 
issues, way beyond the value of their product or services and the employment they 
provide, as well as huge potential to do harm. If we cannot regulate and hold these 
companies to account through the law to ensure business is done in a way that these 
social and environmental issues are properly factored into market decision making, 
then other ways must be found. This is where corporate responsibility comes in. The 
crucial roles of civil society groups and responsible governments are to press with all 
carrots and sticks that can be found for the increasing internalisation of CR into core 
business practices. 
The questions, therefore, should not be about whether companies accepting a wider 
set of environmental and social responsibilities (full CR) is the right way to address 
market failure. Rather, they are: 
(1) Can CR make a positive contribution to public welfare (beyond the value of a 
company’s product or service and the incomes it generates)? 
________________________ 
4  ‘Greenwash’ or ‘Bluewash’: a company talking up its CR policy and programme, including mem-
bership of a voluntary association and signature to agreed principles or guidelines (in the case of 
bluewash to the UN Global Compact), while doing very little in practice. 
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(2) Does CR distract companies from creating the full value of their product or 
service?
(3) Is CR a point of departure towards or a hindrance to the evolution of a better 
market governance system? 
If CR can make a positive difference, then surely it should be encouraged. If making 
that positive difference somehow detracts from a company’s ability to deliver its 
product or service efficiently, then that needs to be properly understood and man-
aged. If encouraging CR is seen as a potential hindrance to the evolution of a better 
governance system, then that danger needs to be openly recognised, debated and 
countered. 
This begs a fourth question: 
(4) What can leading companies, their business associations, civil society organisa-
tions and governments do to make the importance of CR better understood 
and better implemented? 
These four questions are addressed below. 
2. Making a positive difference 
For all the understandable accusations of corporate ‘greenwash’ and in relation to the 
UN Global Compact, ‘bluewash’, it is hard to deny that a significant number of lead-
ing multinational companies have improved their environmental and social perform-
ance. This may still be far below what many would regard as acceptable and many 
more companies may still have hardly begun the CR awakening process, but it is pro-
gress. It is hard to be definite about the extent of this contribution and this would 
certainly be a fertile area for more detailed research. This conclusion is reinforced by 
Margolis and Walsh in their paper ‘Misery loves Companies; rethinking social initia-
tives by business’ (Margolis/Walsh 2003), which argues for a shift of academic re-
search emphasis from the frustrating and perhaps futile attempt to prove a causal link 
between corporate social performance and economic performance to ‘questions about 
what it is firms are actually doing in response to social misery and what effects corpo-
rate actions have, not only on the bottom line but also on society’. Margolis and 
Walsh pose the following research questions:  
 ‘Do companies really make a concrete difference in curing social ills when they 
act as though they can do so?’ 
 ‘How can the assumed truth that companies can be effective agents, not just of 
economic efficiency but of social repair, be realized?’ 
 ‘How can the concrete differences be achieved?’ 
 ‘What are the conditions under which, and the processes through which, the 
intended beneficiaries and institutions central to a healthy society indeed benefit 
from these corporate actions?’ 
While the lengthy process of academic research adapts to this important proposal, the 
following examples at least seem to indicate hopeful, if still inadequate progress. 
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FSC & MSC
Both the Forestry and Marine Stewardship Councils (FSC and MSC) represent small 
but significant attempts at sustainability governance by agreements between compa-
nies and NGOs. B&Q, a leading UK hardware chainstore, uses the FSC standards for 
its hard wood products. The company states “All virgin wood bought by B&Q will 
come from forests of known location where the supplier has given us sufficient reas-
surance that the forest is well managed and independently certified as such. Certifica-
tion must include the ability to trace the wood from the forest to the final processor 
with certified “chain of custody” (B&Q timber buying policy 2000). FSC news January 
2005 states “The largest DIY retailer in the United Kingdom (UK), B&Q has signed a 
deal with the certification body SmartWood, a programme of the Rainforest Alliance, 
to certify its key stores to the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) chain of custody 
standards. 
B&Q is targeting business customers such as government and local authority purchas-
ing departments as well as general trade customers who are increasingly demanding 
timber and manufactured wooden products from well managed forests.5
The more recently started Marine Stewardship Council in its 2004 report6 gives a 
number of examples of well known companies adopting its standard, for example: 
“Leading UK retailer Waitrose has developed its first own brand MSC product (…) 
wild Alaska smoked salmon (…) Waitrose held training sessions on the MSC for all its 
fish-counter staff ahead of launching the product, demonstrating their strong com-
mitment to the programme”. The Daily Telegraph in March 2004 reported that “The 
MSC’s little blue logo is gradually becoming the fishing world’s equivalent of the Soil 
Association’s mark. It’s a sign of sustainability that the accredited fishery has, in con-
trast to many others, a future”. 
NOVARTIS 
Novartis, the Swiss based pharmaceutical company, reports: “In May 2001, Novartis 
committed to a unique public-private collaboration agreement with the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in the fight against malaria. Novartis agreed to make Coartem®, 
currently the only oral fixed dose artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT), avail-
able on a “not-for-profit” basis for distribution to public sector agencies of malaria-
endemic developing countries. Through grants provided by the Global Fund For 
AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, Novartis has equally undertaken to supply Coartem, 
under the aegis of WHO, to public sector agencies. The partnership aims at establish-
ing sustainable supply chains for distribution via support programs covering stock 
management/forecasting and operational research; improving treatment regimens in 
malaria-endemic countries via support of health care education and community 
awareness of treatment policies and use of Coartem; and monitoring systems for new 
malaria drugs in the developing world Beyond providing the treatment, Novartis sup-
ports a capacity building program in Zambia. This program aims at ensuring optimal 
________________________ 
5  See www.fsc.org. 
6  See www.msc.org. 
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levels of patient access to the drug and includes conducting operational research, rais-
ing community awareness and educating healthcare workers”.7
NOVO NORDISK 
Another healthcare company, Novo Nordisk, as part of its “Sustainable Supply Chain 
Management” has developed a “Supplier Evaluation Programme”. The programme 
was initiated as part of Novo Nordisk’s commitment to environmental and social 
responsibility. The Company claims to be “actively seeking to promote social respon-
sibility and a good environmental performance across our business operations. We 
believe that people should be treated fairly and that the impact on the environment 
should be minimised. We do this not only to manage our risk effectively but also be-
cause we think it is the right thing to do. As a truly responsible business, we should be 
able to account for all our activities. If our suppliers are found to be environmentally 
and socially negligent, it reflects badly on us. We therefore expect our suppliers to 
comply with both local legislation and international standards on environmental man-
agement and human rights. (…) In 2003 we asked our suppliers’ opinions on the 
evaluation programme. An independent study was carried out by an external party 
(NOP Healthcare) on behalf of Novo Nordisk.(…) A large majority of suppliers 
agreed that they had a good dialogue with the contact person at Novo Nordisk. (…) 
More than half (56%) of our suppliers believed that Novo Nordisk’s programme had 
a positive impact on their internal operations”.8
As Simon Zadek explains in his recent Harvard Business Review article (Zadek 2004) 
the Company is also leading the way in dialogue with other key stakeholders. “Danish 
pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk has created a practical tool to track societal 
learning on some of its core business issues - animal testing, genetically modified or-
ganisms, and access to drugs. The drugmaker’s approach can be adapted and used by 
any company facing any number of issues. In the early stages, issues tend to be vague 
and their potential significance well below conventional thresholds used by the finan-
cial community to determine materiality. These issues are often first identified through 
a company’s interactions with non-traditional sources of knowledge, such as social 
activists. As one senior business manager explains, when he deals with nongovern-
mental organizations, “I see the future of our markets, our products, and this busi-
ness”.
GAP & REEBOK 
Gap Inc, the US clothing multinational, asserts9 that “improving garment factory con-
ditions is a central element to our overall commitment to social responsibility”. The 
company has drawn up a ‘Code of Vendor Conduct’ and reports that in 2003, 8.500 
visits to garment factories were made and provides details of the levels of code viola-
tion in different regions and what is being done about them. 
________________________ 
7  See www.novartis.com. 
8  See www.novonordisk.com. 
9  See www.gap.com. 
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Another well known brand in the clothing and footwear industry, Reebok, has devel-
oped an impressive worker communication system, which provides workers with a 
secure way of expressing concerns in a manner which enables the company’s man-
agement to focus on specific issues as they arise. The company has openly accepted 
the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining and is actively pur-
suing this in difficult places like Indonesia and China. The Boston Globe in January 
2005 reported that Reebok is supporting a new organization called the Fair Factories 
Clearinghouse. It will help develop and distribute a piece of software that was origi-
nally built by the Company’s technology group to track the working conditions at 
factories where Reebok’s shoes and apparel are made. 
SHELL
A number of companies are leading the drive to counter the prevalence of bribery and 
facilitation payments in so many countries in the world. Among these, the oil com-
pany Shell has established a very clear ‘no bribes’ policy. The Company has produced 
management primers on bribery, corruption and related dilemmas. Most of its na-
tional operations have procedures to prevent facilitation payments by staff, contrac-
tors and suppliers. Proven incidents of bribery are reported (8 in 2003) and offenders 
disciplined.10
BP
Finally, another oil company, BP, has recently helped to advance the role played by 
such companies in the protection of human rights. Although the Company has a 
strong policy commitment on human rights, based on the Universal Declaration, it 
found itself inadvertently in danger of potentially denying human rights to the indige-
nous communities living along the path of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (“BTC”) oil and 
gas pipeline project, for which BP is the lead contractor. A detailed report by Amnesty 
International ‘Human Rights on the Line’ (Amnesty International 2003), demonstrated 
that the Project Agreements could have a ‘chilling effect’ on the host governments’ 
willingness to enforce their human rights, labour rights, and environmental obligations 
pursuant to international treaties. Amnesty warned that the land acquisition could 
have the effect of resettling the 30.000 people who would be forced to give up their 
land rights to make way for the pipeline; there could be inadequate enforcement of 
health and safety legislation to protect workers and local people; and there could be a 
serious risk to the human rights of any individuals who protest against the pipeline. 
Amnesty expressed particular concern that the Host Government Agreements 
(HGAs) would create a disincentive for the host countries to protect human rights 
because the governments have agreed to pay compensation to the BTC consortium if 
pipeline construction or operation is disturbed pursuant to the HGA clause indicating 
that host countries are liable for any disruption to the economic equilibrium of the 
project. Having participated in a public meeting to launch the report and after due 
consideration of the arguments BP accepted Amnesty’s conclusions. After lengthy 
negotiations between lawyers representing the two organisations a compromise set-
________________________ 
10  See www.shell.com. 
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tlement was reached in which a Deed Poll (a legally binding contract designed to pro-
tect the rights of the three host governments to promote and regulate human rights 
and environmental issues) was drafted and then signed by the BTC Project. Subse-
quent to this agreement, BP and Amnesty have had discussions with the IFC, which 
provided loans to the BTC project. It is to be hoped that these and future talks will 
pave the way for the IFC to create guidelines for the HGAs of similar projects in the 
future to contain adequate provision for human rights protection. 
There would seem to be enough probability here that large companies can make a 
positive difference to justify taking the precautionary principle and act on that as-
sumption. This is surely more than a mere smokescreen, designed to distract govern-
ments from taking proper regulatory control, which is the thrust of Joel Bakan’s ar-
gument. To quote the Margolis and Walsh paper again: ‘We suggest adopting a prag-
matic stance toward questions about the firm’s role in society, one articulated most 
clearly by William James: “Grant an idea or belief to be true”, it [pragmatism] says, 
“what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone’s actual life? How will the 
truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those that would obtain if 
the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?” 
The first step of James’s pragmatic approach is to assume that an idea is true. In this 
case, we need to begin with the idea that organisations can play an effective role in 
ameliorating social misery. From that beginning, pragmatism then instructs us to look 
at the consequences of acting on this belief. “Do companies really make a concrete 
difference in curing social ills when they act as though they can do so?” (Mar-
golis/Walsh 2003). 
3. CR a distraction from the real business of business? 
The objection to companies devoting resources to external social concerns, a principal 
argument of the Economist, which goes back at least to Friedman’s insistence that 
“the business of business is business” (Friedman 1970), is that it diverts management 
from its proper and most value creating role, not just value for shareholders but also 
for society as a whole. There can be no doubt that taking account of the environ-
mental and social impacts of a company, both negative and potentially positive, adds 
to the accounting costs, requires greater management expertise and time and adds 
complexity through the loss of having just one bottom line objective and success 
measure. In that sense proper attention to CR by companies might cause certain 
products to be more expensive or produced in lower quantities. But that is what 
should happen anyway if the regulatory environment did what Bakan and The 
Economist argue that it should, namely ensure that environmental and social costs 
inflicted by companies were either paid for through taxes or prevented by law. So the 
main point must be not that these ‘external’ costs are ‘internalised’ but that it is too 
difficult and beyond the competence of business managers to handle these issues and 
therefore undermines the effective functioning of the company. 
This may be so. But should business be allowed to be that simple; protected from 
understanding and managing all aspects of its value creation and destruction? There 
may be painful transition processes but should not companies be expected to adapt to 
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these higher expectations of performance? It can be done as the transformation of 
BP’s exploration business shows.  
During the 1980s and early ’90s, BP developed and produced most of its oil and gas 
from fields it had discovered in the North Sea and Alaska. This was done with brilliant 
technology and considerable, if inadequate in the views of some, attention to the envi-
ronment. As these fields began to be depleted, most of the Company’s new oil and gas 
discoveries were made in places with very different problems, like Colombia, Angola 
and Papua, Indonesia. At first, BP relied on staff with experience of the North Sea 
and Alaska, to develop its production sites in the Casanare region of Colombia. These 
were mainly highly skilled engineers, driven by production targets and used to deliver-
ing on time. They had not come across social issues before. If there was a security 
problem, put up barbed wire fences and get the army in to protect you. If the locals 
are unhappy, hire a team to build a school, improve the water supply or support new 
business ventures. Problem solved. Not so. The Colombian army had another agenda, 
its war against ‘terrorists’, and BP got sucked in by association to the human rights 
abuses in which the army was implicated. BP’s social projects, while admirable in 
themselves, were so totally separated from company personnel and the oil develop-
ment work that no real links were made and no mutual understanding with the local 
community developed.  
Following reputation damaging media reports and much internal management debate, 
BP has evolved a strategy to deal with this new reality of doing business in places with 
major social problems, often associated with conflict. It has been a leading participant 
in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,11 it has developed guide-
lines, training, management and reporting systems on these issues, including engaging 
with difficult governments. It is also working on much stronger stakeholder engage-
ment, particularly with local communities, and is much more transparent about what it 
is doing in its public reporting processes. The Company still faces many problems and 
makes many mistakes (Donnan 2005) but it is a clear example of how management 
can adapt successfully to having to take account of wider issues than the immediate 
bottom line. And there is no suggestion that these activities are a distraction from the 
company’s profit-making business. On the contrary they are a necessary, if often frus-
trating and difficult, part of doing business and the better BP gets at these things the 
more successful the company will be. 
To be fair to the Economist articles, they do include the assertion that “managers 
ought to behave ethically as they pursue proper business of maximising owner value – 
and that puts real constraints on their actions”. The article quotes from Elaine Stern-
berg’s book ‘Just Business’ saying that owner value excludes “lying, cheating, stealing, 
killing, coercion, physical violence and most illegalit”. Instead honesty, fairness and 
ordinary decency are called for. Splendid, but as Sir Geoffrey Chandler (2005) points 
out in his letter responding to the Economist articles “[the] challenge is the prevailing 
public distrust of companies arising from the perception that profit precedes principle, 
rather than being based upon it. Nothing could better illustrate the validity of this 
perception than the recent twentieth anniversary of the Bhopal disaster – one of the 
________________________ 
11  See www.voluntaryprinciples.org.
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worst examples of safety being compromised and adequate compensation denied in 
the interest of corporate profit. (…) Certainly a company whose practices are based 
on ‘ordinary decency’ will thrive, but this attractively naïve concept is unlikely to be 
helpful to those who actually have to manage in the many countries today character-
ised by unrepresentative government, corruption, discrimination, violence and human 
rights violations”. Managers may be the agents of the owners and obligated to do their 
best to provide them with value but they are also guardians of ethical values and as-
surance that value is created honestly and without undue cost in terms of adverse 
environmental and social impact. All responsible large companies, especially multina-
tional companies operating across national borders and differing cultures and value 
systems need to support their managers with carefully thought-out value statements, 
policies, codes of behaviour, training, support, monitoring and reporting systems. 
4. Is CR a point of departure towards or a hindrance to the evolution of a 
better market governance system? 
The main problem is not so much that behaving responsibly is a distraction from 
single-minded pursuit of profitability but that the responsible company’s competitors 
may not play by the same rules. This is what business people call the problem of ‘the 
level playing field’. Ideally this should be provided by government. Whether ultimately 
this will come in the form of a global convergence towards one system of government 
and society based on a concept of ‘market democracy’ underpinned by international 
law or a complex mixture of co-existing country-based governing structures, or some 
other scenario, is hard to foresee. But government provided level playing fields are 
unlikely to happen anytime soon. They may never happen. So anything that can be 
done in the meantime to make things even a little bit better by working on and with 
organisations that can make a real difference on the ground must be worthwhile. En-
couraging the positive application of CR, the development of voluntary codes of prac-
tice, norms and reporting systems, could gradually enable the evolution of a better 
governance system as expectations develop into ‘soft law’, which in turn evolves into 
‘harder’ law. CR can hardly be accused of hindering the evolution of a better market 
governance system, when there is no evidence of such evolution taking place without 
CR taking a leading role. The challenge is how to make playing fields less sloped in 
favour of the bad guys in an under or inconsistently regulated market place, while at 
the same time working towards the ideal of effective and enforceable regulation. It is a 
challenge for those in a position to influence company behaviour, in particular the 
companies themselves, their business associations, civil society organisations or 
NGOs and national governments.
5. What can leading companies, their business associations, civil society 
organisations and governments do to make the importance of CR better 
understood and better implemented? 
There is a clear need for more transparency and better accountability systems. One 
way, of course, is to invest in information systems, which let all the key players know 
what everyone else is doing, so that decisions by investors, customers, suppliers and 
current and potential employees are made in a more informed manner. The methods 
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used by the rapidly growing socially responsible investment (SRI) movement are help-
ing to lead the way. The FTSE4GOOD index12 is one example. This very public indi-
cation of whether or not leading FTSE companies have complied with some mini-
mum environmental and human rights standards has perhaps done more than any 
other single initiative in the UK, at least, to raise the profile of these issues in corpo-
rate boardrooms and shareholder groups. The recent introduction of tougher human 
rights conditions led to the withdrawal of some companies from the index, which can 
only have done some good. Another initiative is the Business & Human Rights Re-
source Centre,13 which runs the leading Internet site providing information on what 
companies are doing both to enhance and constrain human rights. The work depends 
on an international network of experts plus a small central team, making full use of 
the latest communication technology to draw attention to reports and breaking news 
from many sources, for instance from NGOs, academics, journalists and companies 
themselves. Its purpose is to make available information in an easily accessible way, 
for others to take action as they think fit. 
In principle it should be in the interests of ‘good’ companies to make sure that ‘bad’ 
companies do not get away with cost-saving poor CR performance. It is frustrating for 
many trying to make progress on these issues that so often those companies which 
declare themselves to be among the good guys, while leading the way on voluntary 
initiatives, are the first to resist any moves towards more formal codes of behaviour or 
regulation designed bring more companies into compliance with minimum standards 
(i.e. levelling at least the foundations of the field). In the recent debate over the UN 
Norms on Human Rights a number of companies which to a large extent already ap-
ply most of the basic content of the Norms, nevertheless allowed associations of 
which they are members, like the International Chamber of Commerce, to campaign 
strongly against the formal adoption of the Norms by the UN Sub Commission on 
Human Rights. Others, of course, for instance members of the Business Leaders’ 
Initiative on Human Rights (BLIHR),14 have taken a much more constructive ap-
proach by ‘road testing’ the Norms, in other words examining how applying the 
Norms in practice impacts their operations and, in March 2006, intending to report 
their findings. Leading companies clearly do need to come off the fence and take ac-
tive leadership roles in formulating the necessary rules of the game and influencing the 
associations to which they belong to do likewise. 
The role of NGOs is just as problematic. In a world where representative government 
is at best weakened in its ability to look after the common interest and at worst unrep-
resentative and corrupt, NGOs act, with varying degrees of legitimacy, as representa-
tives of particular interests, such as the environment or human rights. Acting as 
watchdogs and whistle-blowers, they have become a form of counter-vailing power to 
that wielded by large companies, although with considerably less financial resources 
________________________ 
12  See www.ftse.com/ftse4good/index. 
13  See www.business-humanrights.org. 
14  See www.blihr.org. BLIHR companies ‘road testing’ the Norms include ABB, Barclays, Hewlett 
Packard, MTV Europe, National Grid Transco, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Statoil and The Body 
Shop International. 
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and often less formal rights in existing law. Within this countervailing force there is 
considerable difference of opinion as whether to pursue undiluted oppositional tactics 
to what companies are doing or whether to engage in constructive dialogue and even 
partnership. Indeed more radical groups, like London Rising Tide15 openly criticise the 
likes of WWF and Greenpeace for taking part in joint conferences with leading oil and 
mining companies for selling out to big business and contributing to the plague of 
‘greenwash’. It is interesting to note that only 10 years ago it was Greenpeace, which 
first recognised the emerging power of civil society to pressurise companies independ-
ently of government action, in its high profile action against Shell and the sinking its 
Brent Spar oil storage unit in the North Atlantic. Since then the campaigning envi-
ronmental organisation, like several other leading NGOs, has grown as a ‘political’ 
institution and has been drawn into more of a problem solving role alongside its whis-
tle blowing one. It has come to take a more pragmatic view that for all their failings, 
companies have a huge role to play in solving the world’s major problems. They have 
to be part of the solutions not just a cause of the problems, and they need all the help 
they can be given. How that help is given, how it is paid for, how NGOs retain their 
integrity, independence and ability to take oppositional action as required, are current 
hot issues. 
Nevertheless, NGOs do have a major role to play in articulating the expectations on 
corporate behaviour of civil society and campaigning, through engagement and/or 
oppositional tactics as necessary, for their realisation. For example, whatever happens 
to the UN Norms on Business and Human Rights in the long drawn out UN govern-
ance process, it is imperative that Amnesty International and other human rights 
NGOs continue to press companies to adopt them as the basis for their human rights 
performance. They are the new level of expectations that society is placing on compa-
nies. There is every reason to believe that this will make a difference to people whose 
human rights are under threat in many different ways in countries where these com-
panies are operating. NGOs should resist calls to switch their focus back to just na-
tional governments. They need to work on both companies and governments. While it 
is important that they are not hoodwinked by ‘greenwash’, there is no reason for con-
structive NGOs to draw back on efforts to encourage worthwhile if still small ad-
vances as described in the cases above, as long as they can be genuinely seen to be a 
positive step towards larger and longer lasting solutions. Meanwhile, the London Ris-
ing Tides of this world have every right to campaign as they do and have an important 
point to make but they would do better if they also articulated a realistic vision of how 
to create the ‘more compassionate system than capitalism’ that they want. 
It is very much part of the role of NGOs to try to influence governments on how they 
can, in turn, influence companies to take on responsibilities for environmental and 
social issues. Most NGO staff and volunteers instinctively want to pressurise govern-
ments to regulate company behaviour, for instance to bring in compulsory social re-
porting and make companies liable to prosecution for complicity in human rights 
abuses in third world countries. While these campaigns should continue because they 
are necessary parts of any long term solution to making all companies take these issues 
________________________ 
15 See http://risingtide.org.uk. 
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seriously, there are many less politically difficult things that governments can be per-
suaded to do in the shorter term. Their position on processes like the UN Norms and 
the OECD guidelines for multinational companies can be influenced by well organ-
ised lobbying, not least by persuading leading companies to add their voices for con-
structive change. Governments can be persuaded to give public praise to top perform-
ing companies and reward their leaders with recognition and invitations to prestigious 
networking events, which are very highly prized in the business world. Perhaps most 
significantly, in every country governments are large customers of many of the com-
panies NGOs are concerned about. There are huge opportunities to influence gov-
ernment purchasing decisions and contract clauses to reflect company environmental 
and social performance as well as its price competitiveness. Finally many companies 
trading abroad do so with the help of Government Export Credit Guarantees. These 
conditions can also be influenced. 
6. Conclusion
This paper set out to refute both Bakan’s argument that CSR is largely a smokescreen 
designed to distract governments from their proper role in regulating for market fail-
ure and The Economist’s argument that CSR distracts companies from their main 
profit-making activities and, therefore, reduces the value they create for society. Both 
argue that the issues CSR seeks to address are the proper concern of governments. 
Through a number of examples, it was shown that companies, which understand and 
put into practice their corporate responsibility (CR, see footnote 3) can make a posi-
tive contribution to public welfare through the manner in which they operate, beyond 
the value of their product or service and the incomes they generate. From a short term 
profit-making point of view, managing this contribution may be a distraction and it 
does not come without cost. Nor should it be, however, as social and environmental 
costs should be factored into the costs of production. Ethically it is certainly the right 
thing to do and often, as in the case of oil and gas exploration, it is a crucial part of 
earning a ‘licence to operate’. In the wider sense it is part of the way in which compa-
nies can begin to earn the trust of society that they do not put profit before principle. 
A pressing problem is how to create a more effective regulatory environment to ‘level 
the playing field’ by making the market take account of social and environmental costs 
and benefits. It was argued that CR could not justifiably be seen as a hindrance to the 
effective evolution of a proper market governance system. On the contrary it is a cru-
cial part of the only realistic game in town and could become a building block in the 
evolution of ‘soft’ into ‘hard’ law. The final section of this paper suggested a number 
of ways in which CR could be encouraged and made more effective, chiefly by invest-
ing in better information systems from which greater transparency and accountability 
could be achieved. 
Clearly, no sensible person would recommend a governance system which depends 
totally on the interplay of market forces, corporate self-governance and pressure from 
NGOs. It does sound rather like Joel Bakan’s undesirable corporate ‘Hallelujah’ sce-
nario, described above. Corporations do need more effective governance than this and 
the common interest does need protecting by those with the authority and compe-
tence to do so. Nevertheless, while the ‘Hallelujah’ scenario, in part at least, is the 
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current reality we need to do all we can to make it work as well as possible. It is not 
good enough arguing that environmental and social agendas are the proper concern of 
governments, when governments are manifestly failing to address these agendas ade-
quately. The interplay of NGOs and companies in promoting corporate responsibility 
does not replace the need for effective government, but it does fill in some of the gaps 
and encourage governments to understand what they should be doing. 
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